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Racial Vote Dilution in Multimember Districts: The Constitu-
tional Standard After Washington v. Davis 
Political equality demands more than mere arithmetical compli-
ance with the "one person, one vote" standard for apportionment. 1 
Election districting schemes must ensure each voter "an equally ef-
fective voice" in the political process.2 Multimember districting, in 
which the district-wide constituency elects at-large two or more rep-
resentatives, can deny racial minorities an equal opportunity to par-
ticipate in the district's political processes. The Supreme Court 
recognized this fact in White v. Regester,3 in which it held that multi-
member districts that "cancel out or minimize'' minority voting 
strength violate the equal protection clause.4 
The protection developed in White against vote dilution in mul-
timember districts now faces a serious challenge. In a case subse-
quent to White, Washington v . .Davis,S the Supreme Court insisted 
that plaintiffs alleging racial discrimination in violation of the equal 
protection clause must prove that the defendant harbored a racially 
discriminatory intent.6 In contrast, the standard used in the multi-
member district cases rests squarely upon effect: whether, in light of 
''the totality of the circumstances,"7 the multimember district mini-
mizes or cancels out voting strength. 8 
This Note argues that the effect-oriented standard for multimem-
ber-district vote-dilution claims is unaffected by the Washington in-
tent requirement. Part I outlines the manner in which multimember 
districts can dilute minority voting strength. After summarizing 
Washington's intent requirement, Part II surveys the post-Washing-
ton vote dilution cases and demonstrates that the applicability of the 
I. See R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 17 (1968); Carpeneti, Legislative Appor-
tionment: Mu/timember .Districts and Fair Representation, 120 U. PA: L. REv. 666, 669 (1972). 
2. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). 
3. 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973). 
A. Multimember districts may deny political minorities an equal voice as well. See Fort• 
son v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). Thus far, however, only racial minorities have successfully 
attacked multimember districts. The test established in White, the only Supreme Court case 
invalidating a multimember district, focuses upon racial vote dilution. 
5. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
6. 426 U.S. at 240. 
7. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973). 
8. In addition to White, see Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Zimmer v. 
McKeithen, 485 F .2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) ( en bane), o/.[d. per curiam on other grounds sub nom. 
East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). 
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intent standard to vote dilution claims is uncertain. Part III first sug-
gests two ways in which White and Washington may be reconciled. 
That section then argues that White is unaffected by the intent re-
quirement because the standard for vote dilution fits within a funda-
mental interest analysis not altered by Washington. Finally, Part III 
asserts that, even if racial vote dilution is treated as a form of racial 
discrimination, the effect-oriented test used in White survives be-
cause it is not the kind of disproportionate-impact analysis rejected 
in Washington. 
I. THE PROBLEM WITH MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS 
Multimember districting tends to submerge the votipg strength of 
racial or ethnic minorities. For example, suppose that over half the 
voters in a single-member district are black. If a multimember dis-
trict is formed by combining that district with districts containing a 
majority of white voters, the black voters might constitute something 
less than a majority of the larger district's voting population. If that 
occurs, the black voters have been "submerged" in the white major-
ity. Under some circumstances, such a submergence dilutes the vot-
ing strength of the minority, thereby impairing that group's ability to 
elect the representative of its choice. Under White, such vote dilu-
tion in a multimember district denies that minority's right to "effec-
tive participation in political life" in violation of the equal protection 
clause. 
Of course, multimember districting will not inevitably dilute mi-
nority voting strength. It cannot be said in the abstract that a mi-
nority would prefer complete control over the representative of a 
single-member district to an influence short of control of two or 
more representatives of a multimember district.9 Consequently, the 
Supreme Court has refused to hold multimember districts per se un-
constitutional.10 In White, the only case in which it has found a 
9. See UNITED STATES CoMMN. ON CML RIGHTS, POLffiCAL PARTICIPATION 21 n.6 
(1968): 
Nor does every measure which has the effect of diluting the votes of Negroes necessarily 
have an adverse effect on Negro voters. For example, some would argue that it is better 
for Negroes to constitute 40 percent of the voters of two districts-almost half the constit-
uencies of two representatives-than 80 percent of the voters of one district. 
In addition, see Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1964); Jewell, Local Systems ef 
Representation: Political Consequences and Judicial Choices, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 790, 798, 
803 (1968). 
10. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973). On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court has recognized several objectionable aspe~ of multimember districting and has ex-
pressed a preference against it, absent unusual circumstances, in judicially created apportion-
ment schemes. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407,415 (1977); East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. 
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 639 (1976) (per curiam). 
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multimember district unconstitutional, the Court relied on "an in-
tensely local appraisal" of the specific multimember district "in the 
light of past and present reality, political and otherwise." 11 
The presence or history of racial discrimination in the region in 
question is an important factor in determining how multimember 
districting affects minority voting strength. Even past discrimina-
tion by the government may have debilitating effects upon minority 
participation in the political process. The prior use of discrimina-
tory registration tests and poll taxes deprived many potential minor-
ity voters of the opportunity or inclination to vote. Until recently, 
segregative policies of the political parties deprived minority voters 
of the experience or benefit of political organization. Thus, minori-
ties have had little opportunity to form coalitions and participate in 
the politics of pluralism.12 Furthermore, disproportionately low ed-
ucational, employment, and income levels hinder minority members 
from running for office or working in campaigns. 
Moreover, in a region with a history of racial discrimination, pri-
vate prejudice is likely to be expressed through racial bloc voting. 
An interest group must have more supporters to control an election 
in a multimember district than in a single-member district, 13 of 
course, and thus a racial minority able to elect a favored representa-
tive solely with its own votes in a single-member district might be 
unable to elect a representative of its choice in a multimember dis-
trict without white votes. But minority or minority-supported can-
didates are less able to draw the needed white votes where bloc 
voting occurs along racial lines.14 Moreover, the minority bloc vot-
11. 412 U.S. at 769-70. 
12. See Derfner, Multi-Member Districts and Black Voters, 2 BLACK L.J. 120, 127-28 
(1972). See also Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 15 MICH. L. REv. 1162 (1977). 
Professor Sandalow argues that "pluralistic politics furnish substantial safeguards" to minority 
interests for those legislative judgments made by Congress after considered deliberation or, 
perhaps, made by most state legislatures. Id. at 1191. According to Sandalow, however, 
pluralistic politics may not provide adequate safeguards at local government levels, which 
"experience demonstrates . . . are typically less sensitive to minority interests than the Con-
gress," id. at 1192, and from which minorities may be excluded. But see Auerbach, The Reap-
portionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 52: 
"To mobilize a majority of the votes in an election, each political party must appeal to a 
variety of 'interests' and a wide spectrum of opinion. . . . In short, the 'monolithic' majority 
. . . does not exist; the majority is but a coalition of minorities which must act in a moderate, 
broadly representative fashion to preserve itself." Professor Auerbach's analysis might well be 
an accurate description of the pluralistic pasturing involved in most elections. It does not, 
however, satisfactorily assess those elections in which multimember district vote dilution al-
lows the candidates to ignore the interests of a minority group. 
13. See Comment, Effective Representation and Multimember Districts, 68 MICH. L. REV. 
1577, 1586-87 (1970). 
14. Justice White has recognized this fact. In his opinion for the plurality in United Jew-
ish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166-67 (1977), he stated: 
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ing necessary for the group to have a realistic possibility of electing a 
candidate may be exploited by white politicians to generate white 
backlash, thereby strengthening bloc voting against the minority-
supported candidate.15 Thus, where pervasive racial discrimination 
exists, multimember districts enhance the likelihood that discrimina-
tion will affect elections. 
Multimember districts not only increase the difficulty of electing 
minority candidates, they also decrease the likelihood that the mi-
nority will be adequately represented by the successful white candi-
dates. Nonminority representatives who can win elections without 
minority support have little incentive to respond to the particular 
needs and interests of the minority. 16 Multimember districts, then, 
may adversely affect the quality of representation as well as the vot-
ing strength accorded a minority group. 
The use of certain electoral rules increases the vote-diluting im-
pact of multimember districts. 17 A "majority" rule requires a run-
off election between the two candidates with the most votes if no 
candidate receives a majority in the first election. The run-off al-
lows white voters who scattered their votes among various white can-
didates in the first election to consolidate their vote in the second to 
defeat a minority candidate who received a plurality of the vote in 
the first election. A "place" rule, requiring each candidate to run 
Where it occurs, voting for or against a candidate because of his race is an unfortunate 
practice. But it is not rare; and in any district where it regularly happens, it is unlikely 
that any candidate will be elected who is a member of the race that is in the minority in 
that district. 
In addition, see Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 144 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). 
In United Jewish Organizations, Chief Justice Burger expressed disagreement with this con-
cept: ''The notion that Americans vote in firm blocs has been repudiated in the election of 
minority members as mayors and legislators in numerous American cities and districts over-
whelmingly white." 430 U.S. at 187 (dissenting opinion). With all due respect, the Chief Jus-
tice's statement is overbroad. That blacks have been elected in some districts suggests no 
more than that blacks have not been denied participation in the nomination and election 
processes of that district. It neither shows that racial bloc voting has been eradicated in other 
districts nor refutes Justice White's assessment of the impact ofracial bloc voting where it does 
occur. 
15. In White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), the Supreme Court recited a district court 
finding that, as recently as 1970, a "white-dominated organization ... in effective control of 
Democratic Party candidate slating" in a Texas county employed " 'racial campaign tactics in 
white precincts to defeat candidates who had the overwhelming support of the black commu-
nity.'" 412 U.S. at 766-67 (quoting the district court decision Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 
704, 727 (W.D. Tex. 1972)). 
16. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 768 (1973). 
17. For a listing of the various means of vote dilution, see Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to 
At-Large Elections: The /Jilution Problem, IO GA. L. R.Ev. 353, 358-60 (1976); Derfner, Racial 
/Jiscrimination and the Right To Vote, 26 VAND. L. R.Ev. 523, 553-55 (1973). Some of these 
features were involved in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-67 (1973), and in Zimmer v. 
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), ef.ld. per curiam on other grounds 
sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). In addition, see 
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 143 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). 
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for a specific "place" or "post,'' results in head-to-head contests for 
each office. T.hose whites wishing to vote along racial lines thereby 
know which white candidate to vote for to defeat a minority candi-
date. An "anti-single shot" provision requires the voter to vote for 
as many candidates as there are offices to be filled. Under this rule, 
the ballot is given no effect if it contains fewer than the maximum 
number of votes. Thus, unless the minority can field as many candi-
dates as there are offices, the minority voter cannot vote for a minor-
ity candidate without also voting for a nonminority candidate, which 
reduces the minority candidate's chance for election. 
The generalization that a racial minority with influence short of 
control of two or more representatives in a multimember district is 
not conclusively disadvantaged compared to a minority having ma-
jority control of one representative in a single-member district does 
not prove to be accurate in a region characterized by voting along 
racial lines. In that circumstance, less than majority control may be 
tantamount to no control at all. In a region where both official and 
private racial discrimination is less prevalent, however, racial factors 
may play a lesser part in the evaluation of candidates, voting may 
not fall so squarely on racial lines, and multimember districts will 
not inevitably result in racial vote dilution. Where white as well as 
minority candidates must seek support across racial lines and where 
white voters are willing to support minority candidates, the defeat of 
minority candidates will more often be the ordinary result of the po-
litical process than of discrimination inherent in that process.18 
The Supreme Court faced a racial vote dilution challenge to a 
multimember district for the first time in Whitcomb v. Chavis. 19 In 
that case, the plaintiffs alleged that an Indiana statute establishing a 
particular county as a multimember district diluted the vote of urban 
ghetto dwellers, most of whom were poor blacks.20 The Court re-
fused to invalidate the state statute because the plaintiffs had failed 
to carry the burden of proving that the multimember district "uncon-
stitutionally operatefd] to dilute or cancel out" voting strength.21 In 
so holding, the Court noted that no showing had been made that 
18. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971), where the Court determined that, 
on the facts shown, the failure of the minority "to have legislative seats in proportion to its 
population emerges more as a function of losing elections than of built-in bias against poor 
Negroes." 
19. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). A claim of racial vote dilution had been raised in Fortson v. 
Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965), but was not argued before the Supreme Court and therefore 
was not decided. 
20. 403 U.S. at 129. 
21. 403 U.S. at 144, 146. 
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blacks were prevented from registering, voting, or choosing a politi-
cal party and participating in its affairs. Although no express find-
ing appeared in the record, the Court inferred from the evidence that 
the Democratic Party, the dominant party among the urban black 
voters, could not afford to ignore them and did not overlook them in 
selecting candidates. 22 In short, the plaintiffs had failed to show 
that they "had less opportunity than did other Marion County res-
idents to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators 
of their choice. 23 
The Supreme Court sustained a claim of racial vote dilution in a 
multimember system two years later in White v. Regester.24 The 
county-wide multimember districts of Dallas County and Bexar 
County, Texas, were alleged to dilute the vote of blacks and Mexi-
can-Americans, respectively. According to the Court, the "plain-
tiffs' burden [was] to produce evidence to support findings that the 
political processes leading to nomination and election were not 
equally open to participation by the group in question."25 Evidence 
convincing the Court that the plaintiffs had met that burden in-
cluded a history of governmental racial discrimination in the local-
ity; a "majority vote" requirement and "place" rule; the fact that 
only two blacks had ever been elected in Dallas County to the Texas 
House of Representatives; the failure of the legislature in question, 
as well as of the two political parties, to show a good-faith concern 
for minority needs; the recent use of racial campaign tactics; a cul-
tural and language barrier that inhibited the Mexican-Americans' 
participation in Bexar County's electoral process; and restrictive 
voter registration requirements.26 Based on "the totality of the cir-
cumstances," the Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that 
the multimember districts in question excluded plaintiffs "from ef-
fective participation in political life."27 
White v. Regester has often been examined and applied. The 
Fifth Circuit, which has decided most of the multimember district 
cases, explicated White thoroughly in Zimmer v. McKeithen.28 The 
22. 403 U.S. at 149-50 & n.30. 
23. 403 U.S. at 149. 
24. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
25. 412 U.S. at 766. 
26. 412 l.1.S. at 765-69. 
27. 412 U.S. at 769. 
28. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), '!l.fd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. 
East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). Zimmer established "access 
to the political process" as the "barometer of dilution of minority voting strength." 485 F.2d 
at 1303. As to proof establishing a lack of political access, the Zimmer court said that 
[w]here a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of slating candidates, 
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standard developed in Whitcomb and White and adopted in Zim-
mer for deten:niniilg the constitutionality of multimember districts29 
the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests, a tenuous state policy 
underlying the preference for multi-member or at-large districting, or that the existence of 
past discrimination in general precludes the effective participation in the election system, 
a strong case is made. Such proof is enhanced by a showing of the existence of large 
districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions and the lack of 
provision for at-large candidates running from particular geographical subdistricts. The 
fact of dilution is established upon proof of the existence of an aggregate of these factors. 
The Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in White v. Regester .•. demonstrates, 
however, that all these factors need not be proved in order to obtain relief. 
485 F.2d at 1305. 
Zimmer involved the validity of a federal district court-ordered malapportionment remedy 
that included a change from single-member to multimember districts. The Supreme Court 
amrmed the Fifth Circuit's invalidation of the plan solely on the basis of Connor v. Johnson, 
402 U.S. 690 (1971), which stated a preference for single-member districts in court-ordered 
apportionment plans. 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam). The Court explicitly stated that the 
judgment was amrmed "without approval of the constitutional views expressed by the Court 
of Appeals." 424 U.S. at 638. Nonetheless, the Court's opinion did not imply disapproval of 
those views, and the Fifth Circuit has continued to rely on Zimmer. See Nevett v. Sides, 571 
F.2d 209,214 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978); Parnell v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 563 F.2d 180, 184 (5th 
Cir. 1977); David v. Garrison, 553 F.2d 923, 926 (5th Cir. 1977); Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108, 
lll l (5th Cir. 1976). 
29. Minority voting strength may also be diluted by racially gerrymandered single-member 
districts or by annexation that alters the racial composition of the political unit. For a catalog 
of dilutive districting schemes and election procedures, see Derfner, supra note 17, at 553-58. 
A gerrymandered single-member district might either concentrate substantially all the mi-
nority voters within one district, see Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), or divide mi-
nority voters among several districts, see Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); United Jewish 
Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 {1977); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 
(5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977). In the first instance, minority voters may 
complain that their political influence has been diluted because their votes have been restricted 
to one district. In the second instance, minority voters may claim that their voting strength has 
been diluted because their votes have been diffused over several districts and therefore do not 
constitute a strong political force in any one district. 
Although it is unclear what standard the Supreme Court will use to evaluate claims that 
single-member districting schemes impermissibly dilute minority voting strength, recent cases 
suggest that, as in challenges to multimember districts, the Court will inquire whether the plan 
"minimizes or cancels out" minority voting strength. In Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977), 
the Court did not address the contention of black plaintiffs that their voting strength was 
diluted by a reapportionment plan that diffused black voters among several single-member 
districts with white majorities. In dictum, however, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, 
suggested that the plan would be invalid if drawn with the "purpose to minimize the voting 
strength of a minority group," 431 U.S. at 425, but gave no indication about what evidence is 
necessary to show that black voting strength has in fact been minimized. In all but the ex-
treme case, it is open to debate whether a concentration or diffusion minimizes or maximizes 
minority voting strength. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1964), in which black 
intervenors defended a districting plan challenged by black plaintiffs; United Jewish Organiza-
tions, 430 U.S. at 172-73 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). 
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the result in Connor, stated that 
it is not helpful to look at isolated aspects of a statewide apportionment plan in order to 
determine whether a racial or other improperly motivated gerrymander has taken place. 
Districts that disfavor a minority group in one part of the State may be counterbalanced 
by favorable districts elsewhere. A better approach, therefore, is to examine the overall 
effect of the apportionment plan on the opportunity for fair representation of minority 
voters. 
431 U.S. at 427. This notion of overall "fair representation" was advanced earlier in United 
Jewish Organizations. In that case, according to Justice White, the voting strength of a group 
ofHasidic Jews that was split between two districts with black majorities was not minimized or 
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looks to the effect of the district on minority voting strength, not to 
the underlying purpose in fashioning that district.30 Neither Whit-
comb nor White was cited or discussed when, in Washington v. JJa-
vis, the Supreme Court established its intent requirement for racial 
discrimination claims, and the lower courts have neither convinc-
ingly accepted nor rejected the intent requirement in vote dilution 
claims. Thus, the current status of the White standard is uncer-
tain. 31 The most recent Fifth Circuit cases hold that the evidence 
cancelled out "as long as whites in Kings County, as a group, were provided with fair repre-
sentation." 430 U.S. at 166. His discussion implied that "fair representation" loosely corre-
sponds to proportion of population, though the Court has stated that a group's failure to elect 
legislators in proportion to its size does not by itself state a claim of vote dilution. White v. 
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973). Justice Brennan, though concurring in the result, was 
not satisfied that the "vicarious" representation implicit in Justice White's notion of fair repre-
sentation for whites as a group "fully answers the Hasidim's complaint of injustice." 430 U.S. 
at 171 n.l. 
Thus, it appears that the standard for challenges of vote dilution in single-member districts 
may be the same as that stated in White, 412 U.S. at 765: does the plan minimize or cancel out 
the voting strength of the group in question? The Supreme Court has not, however, reached 
agreement on what evidence is necessary to demonstrate a minimization of voting strength in a 
single-member district plan. · 
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has expressly applied to single-member districts both 
the White standard and Zimmer test, see note 28 supra, which were developed to assess vote 
dilution in multimember districts. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 218-19 (5th Cir. 1978); Kirk-
sey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 
(1977); Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 1974). This approach 
seems logical, particularly where minority voters are diffused across several districts. If those 
voters can prove the various factors required by White, they have demonstrated that single-
member districting denies them full and effective participation in the political process. See 
note 63 infra. It will be much more difficult, of course, for minority plaintiffs concentrated in 
one district to show that their vote has been diluted, since it is likely that the process of nomi-
nation and election will be open to minorities in that district and that the minority-favored 
candidate will have a fair opportunity to win. See United Jewish Organizations, 430 U.S. at 
166-67. 
Annexation may dilute minority voting strength simply by adding white voters to the polit-
ical unit. In Holt v. City of Richmond, 459 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 408 
U.S. 931 (1972), the Fourth Circuit, sitting en bane, refused to invalidate an annexation that 
added 45,706 nonblacks and 1,557 blacks to the city of Richmond, Virginia. According to the 
court, the plaintiffs had failed to prove a purposeful design to dilute black voting strength. 
The Supreme Court has not decided a constitutional challenge to an annexation. q: City of 
Richmond v. United States. 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (discussing annexation under the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965). The application of White to an annexation is questionable, since the 
White factors are not pertinent to an annexation. An annexation could conceivably add so 
many nonminority voters to the political unit that a multimember or single-member district 
within that unit comes under suspicion. See generqlly Note, 17ze Right To Vote in Municipal 
Annexations, 88 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1571 (1975). 
30. Zimmer has been recently in~erpreted "as impliedly recognizing the essentiality of in-
tent in dilution cases by establishing certain categories of circumstantial evidence of inten-
tional discrimination." Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 1978). See note 79 infra 
and accompanying text. But see Judge Wisdom's specially concurring opinion in Nevett, 511 
F.2d at 231. Before Washington, however, no court thought that Zimmer or White required 
evidence of discriminatory intent. 
31. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 754 (1978); The Supreme Court, 
1976 Term, 91 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. I, 289 n.34 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 17ze Supreme Court, 1976 
Tenn]. 
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required by the Zimmer test is sufficient to establish circumstantial 
proof of an invidiously discriminatory purpose. 32 Although White 
and Washington can be reconciled in this respect, this Note argues 
that the White vote dilution test should be completely exempted 
from the Washington intent requirement. 
11. THE WASHINGTONlNTENT TEST AND MULTIMEMBER 
DISTRICTS 
For several years the Supreme Court has struggled to describe 
how the purpose and impact of official action are relevant to equal 
protection analysis. The Court's decisions on this problem have 
been described as "somewhat less than a seamless web."33 In Wash-
ington v. Davis,34 the Court attempted to clarify its position by as-
serting that "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially 
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory 
purpose."35 Lower federal courts faced with vote dilution chal-
lenges to multimember districts have responded in disparate ways to 
Washington's intent standard. After discussing Washington and how 
the lower courts in subsequent cases have treated White, this Note 
will argue that proof of invidious discriminatory intent should not be 
required of plaintiffs alleging racial vote dilution in multimember 
districts. 
A. Washington and the Intent Requirement 
The plaintiffs in Washington claimed that a written personnel 
test given to job applicants by the District of Columbia Metropolitan 
Police Department violated the equal protection clause. They pro-
duced evidence that four times as many blacks as whites failed the 
test. On the premise that lack of discriminatory intent in the design 
or use of the test was irrelevant, the District of Columbia Circuit 
held.that the racially disproportionate impact shown by the plaintiffs 
established a denial of equal protection.36 
The Supreme Court reversed. After stating that it had never 
adopted the standard for racial discrimination in employment under 
32. E.g., Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978). 
33. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 148 n.4 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
34. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
35. 426 U.S. at 240. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977). 
36. 512 F.2d'956, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The District of Columbia Circuit applied the 
standard for judging employment tests set out in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 
(1971), in which the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 
512 F.2d at 959. 
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196437 as the equal protection 
standard, the Court insisted that its cases ''have not embraced the 
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether 
it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely 
because it has a racially disproportionate impact."38 Rather, the 
Court declared, "the basic equal protection principle" requires that 
"the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory 
must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."39 
Such a purpose "may often be inferred from the totality of the rele-
vant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more 
heavily on one race than another. . . . Disproportionate impact is 
not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial 
discrimination forbidden by the Constitution," nor does it alone 
compel strict scrutiny by the reviewing court.40 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of discriminatory intent 
again the next Term in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing .Development Corp. 41 In that case, the Seventh Circuit had 
invalidated a municipality's zoning decision on the ground that its 
"ultimate effect" was racially discriminatory.42 The Supreme Court 
reversed, reaffirming its position that the equal protection clause re-
quires proof of invidious discriminatory intent. In discussing the 
types of evidence that might constitute such proof, the Court ac-
knowledged that disproportionate impact was an "important starting 
point."43 In addition, the Court identified as important the historical 
background of the decision, the specific events leading to that deci-
sion, any substantial departure from normal decision-making proce-
dures, and the legislative or administrative history of the decision.44 
B. Supreme Court References to White v. Regester 
After Washington v. Davis 
Although the Supreme Court has not decided any vote dilution 
cases involving multimember districts since Washington,45 it has re-
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970). 
38. 426 U.S. at 239 (emphasis original). 
39. 426 U.S. at 240. 
40. 426 U.S. at 242. 
41. 429 U.S. 25_2 (1977). 
42. 517 F.2d 409, 414 (7th Cir. 1975). 
43. 429 U.S. at 266. 
44. 429 U.S. at 267-68. The Court did not purport to make an exhaustive summary of the 
possible evidence of purposeful discrimination. 429 U.S. at 268. 
45. However, the Court has agreed to review the decisipn in Wise v. Lipscomb, 551 F.2d 
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ferred to White in subsequent apportionment cases.46 None of the 
references, however, reveal whether the Court considers Washing-
ton's intent standard to have affected White's effect-oriented test for 
multimember districts. Writing for the Court in United Jewish Or-
ganizations v. Carey,41 Justice White used the standard of White to 
explain that Hasidic Jews, whose community had been divided be-
tween two districts in a reapportionment plan, had not suffered a 
fourteenth or fifteenth amendment violation since "the plan did not 
minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength."48 In his 
1043 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978), which involves the limited use of at-
large elections in a state-drawn apportionment plan. 
46. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 
144 (1977). 
47. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
48. 430 U.S. at 165. The fifteenth amendment states that the right to vote "shall not be 
denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The 
role of that amendment in multimember district challenges is uncertain. White was clearly 
based upon the fourteenth amendment. See 412 U.S. at 767. As discussed in Part III infta, the 
standard used in White was first announced in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965), 
The Fortson decision was clearly rooted in the fourteenth amendment and not the fifteenth 
because the multimember district in question was attacked by nonminority plaintiffs. Thus, in 
White, the Court handled the multimember district problem only under the fourteenth amend-
ment even though the plaintiffs alleging vote dilution were blacks and Mexican-Americans. 
Nonetheless, some lower courts have assumed, without discussion, that proof of the White 
standard indicates a violation of the fifteenth as well as the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., 
David v. Garrison, 553 F.2d 923, 925, 928 (5th Cir. 1977); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 
F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977). In the most recent pro-
nouncement on the subject, a Fifth Circuit panel expressly held that the fifteenth amendment, 
like the fourteenth, requires a showing of improper intent. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 220-
21 (5th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 
(1977), Justice White seemed to suggest that the same evidence, including the fact that the 
districting plan in question did not "mioiroi:re or cancel out" voting strength, is probative 
under both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. 430 U.S. at 165-67. In the same case, 
Justice Stewart cited White while discussing the fifteenth amendment, 430 U.S. at 179 (concur-
ring opinion), though one year earlier in his opinion for the Court in Beer v. United States, 425 
U.S. 130, 142 n.14 (1976), he had cited White as a fourteenth amendment ease. At least where 
racial vote dilution is alleged, then, it appears to make little difference which amendment is 
invoked. The multimember district problem cannot be completely relegated to the fifteenth 
amendment, however, since the Supreme Court is still willing to hear vote dilution complaints 
from political as well as racial groups. See text at notes 142-162 infta. 
Even if the While test has been incorporated into the fifteenth amendment, the questions 
remain whether that amendment should provide even greater protection than the fourteenth 
and whether the fifteenth amendment would be violated in circumstances other than those 
relevant to the White test. The fifteenth amendment standard, specifically the significance of 
purpose and effect, is as unclear today as the fourteenth amendment standard was before 
Washington. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 148 n.4 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); 
Harper v. Levi, 520 F.2d 53, 69-71 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Bui see Nevel/, 511 F.2d at 220-21. 
Justice Stewart, writing for the court in Beer, implied that purposeful discrimination is as 
necessary under the fifteenth as the fourteenth amendment. 425 U.S. at 142 n.14. In his 
dissenting opinion in Beer, Justice Marshall attempted to show that the fifteenth amendment 
standard was the same as that of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1970 & 
Supp. V 1975)-that is, whether the law or official act in question has the purpose or effect of 
abridging the right to vote. 425 U.S. at 148-49. Even in that attempt, however, Justice Mar-
shall could not untangle the fourteenth and fifteenth amendment precedents. 425 U.S. at 148 
n.4, 156 & n.15. 
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concurrence, Justice Brennan cited Whitcomb v. Chavis,49 the ante-
cedent of White, as an example of "a classification that effectively 
downgraded minority participation in the franchise."50 Such a classi-
fication,. Justice Brennan claimed, would be suspect and prohibited. 
Finally, Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, cited White in sup-
port of his contention that the Hasidic Jews had not proved a fif-
teenth amendment violation because they "made no showing that 
the redistricting scheme was employed as part of a 'contrivance to 
segregate'; to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of a minor-
ity class or interest; or otherwise to impair or burden the opportunity 
of affected persons to participate in the political process."51 
At the least, these references suggest that the standard for judging 
multimember districts remains the same as that stated in 
'White-that is, whether the plan minimizes or cancels out voting 
strength. Unfortunately, they do not clarify whether proof of invidi-
ous discriminatory purpose must now be included among the various 
factors showing the minimization in voting strength. Writing for the 
Court in United Jewish Organizations, Justice White analyzed the 
"impact of the . . . plan on the representation of white voters in the 
The fifteenth amendment's proscription against abridging the right to vote "on account of 
race" could be read to embrace the concerns about irrationality, stigma, and frustration under-
lying the fourteenth amendment's proscription of racial discrimination. See text at notes 135-
38 infra. However, the fifteenth amendment leaves open the possibility that voters and 
nonvoters may be differentiated on the bases of attributes other than race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude. Although differentiations on such bases as literacy or age could con-
ceivably stigmatize or frustrate nonvoters, they are less likely to rest upon irrational assump-
tions as to the relative worth of different groups than differentiations on the basis of race. 
Thus, the fifteenth amendment's prohibition could be limited to racially motivated decisions 
that deny or abridge the right to vote. Most of the Supreme Court's fifteenth amendment 
decisions can be interpreted as resting upon such an intent standard. See, e.g., Wright v. 
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Terry v. Adams, 
345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
On the other hand, it can be argued that, because the fifteenth amendment singles out the 
right to vote as deserving express constitutional protection against infringement on account of 
race, that amendment guards against more than stigma and frustration. A decision abridging 
the right to vote because of race would therefore be impermissible. 
For the development of the theory that the fifteenth amendment provides "an aggregate 
right to potential proportional representation for racial groups," see Note, United Jewish Orga-
nizations v. Carey and the Need To Recognize Aggregate Voting Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 571,572 
(1978). 
49. 403 U.S. 124 (1971), discussed in text at notes 21-25 supra. 
50. 430 U.S. at 170. Justice Brennan's invocation of the "suspect classification" doctrine is 
curious. The Supreme Court has not spoken of suspect classifications in any of the cases 
involving multimember districts. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. 
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 
U.S. 433 (1965). Although race is clearly a suspect classification, Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), the Court in Whitcomb did not take that approach to the problem of 
multimember districts. See Note, JJiscriminato,y Fjfect oJ Elections At-Large: The "Totality oJ 
Circumstances" JJoctrine, 41 ALB. L. REv. 363, 372 (1977). 
51. 430 U.S. at 179. 
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county . . as a whole,"52 and thereby strongly suggested that effect 
alone remains the focus. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion 
seemed to agree with that suggestion. On the other hand, Justice 
Stewart's comment might indicate that he would require a pur-
poseful minimization or cancelling of the minority vote. 
Moreover, the plaintiffs in United Jewish Organizations ques-
tioned the constitutionality of a single-member district plan, not of a 
multimember district scheme. Although Justice White's concern 
with the impact of white voters in the county "as a whole" appears to 
recognize an effect test, his opinion is inconclusive, since it may have 
merely reflected the concern expressed a month later by Justice 
Blackmun in Connor v. Finch:53 because one single-member district 
that disfavors some group may be counterbalanced by a second dis-
trict elsewhere that favors that group, "it is not helpful to look at 
isolated aspects" of the plan for evidence of improper motive.54 
Rather, Justice Blackmun contended, the Court should examine the 
"overall effect" of the plan on voting strength.55 Thus, Justice 
White may have focused on effect in United Jewish Organizations to 
avoid a possibly misleading inquiry into the isolated aspects of the 
single-member plan that the Hasidic Jews challenged. Multimem-
ber districts do not present that problem, however, since they will not 
involve any "counterbalancing" of districts favoring or disfavoring 
particular groups and thus involve no misleading "isolated aspects." 
Justice White's analysis does not necessarily imply, therefore, that 
the Court will not require proof of discriminatory purpose in chal-
lenges to multimember districts.56 
52. 430 U.S. at 166. I 
53. 431 U.S. 407 (1977). 
54. 431 U.S. at 427 (concurring opinion). 
55. 431 U.S. at 427. 
56. The Supreme Court also referred to White in Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977), 
Because the apportionment in question in that case failed to satisfy even the basic one-person, 
one-vote standard, the Court did not address the plaintiffs' allegation that it also diluted black 
voting strength. The Court did, however, cite White and Whitcomb when referring to the 
plaintiff's "claim of impermissible racial dilution." 431 U.S. at 422 & n.22. In light of the 
fact that United Jewish Organizations predated Connor, it could be inferred that this citation 
affirms the supposition that White's "minimire or cancel out" language survived United Jewish 
Organizations and remains the standard for vote dilution claims. However, to infer from this 
naked citation that the Court will add discriminatory intent to White's list of evidentiary fac-
tors would be mere conjecture. If anything, dicta in the Connor opinion suggest that, at least in 
regard to single-member districting, a showing of discriminatory purpose will be required, 
See 431 U.S. at 425-26. 
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C. Lower Court .Decisions on the Intent Requirement in Vote 
Dilution Cases 
The Fifth Circuit's post-Washington vote dilution decisions57 
have Iiot been completely consistent, though one panel of that court 
may have reconciled these decisions in four consolidated cases re-
cently decided. In Paige v. Gray,58 the first of the decisions after 
Washington, black voters challenged an at-large system of electing 
city commissioners. The district court, relying on Gomillion v. 
Lighifoot,59 a fifteenth amendment case, had invalidated the system 
because its "inevitable effect" was to dilute black voting strength.60 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court 
for evaluation under the standards developed in White and Zimmer, 
warning that "it is likely that the Supreme Court will require circum-
stantial proof of unlawful motive."61 The panel probably did not 
believe, however, that Washington's intent requirement would pose a 
substantial obstacle to the plaintiffs or the district court. The only 
quotation of Washington in the Paige opinion was of Justice Steven's 
concession that where the disproportionate impact is as dramatic as 
in Gomillion, "'it really does not matter whether the standard is 
phrased in terms of purpose or effect.' "62 
Sitting en bane in the second of the post- Washington cases, 
Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors,63 the Fifth Circuit considered 
57. In chronological order, Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1976); Kirksey v. Board 
of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977); David 
v. Garrison, 553 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1977); Parnell v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 563 F.2d 180 
(5th Cir. 1977), and four consolidated cases: Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978); 
Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978); Blacks United for Lasting Leadership, 
Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 571 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1978); Thomasville Branch of the NAACP v. 
Thomas County, 571 F.2d 2S7 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). 
S8. 538 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1976). 
59. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See text at note 121 i'!fra. 
60. 399 F. Supp. 457, 464 (M.D. Ga. 1975). 
61. 538 F.2d at 1110. 
62. 538 F.2d at 1110 n.3 (quoting 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)). See 
text at note I 19 i'!fra. 
63. 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977). The plaintiffs 
in Kirksey claimed that a redistricting scheme diluted black voting strength by splitting a 
concentrated black community among five districts. The Fifth Circuit applied the standards 
developed in White and Zimmer for judging vote dilution in multimember districts on the 
assumption that "they have equal application to redistricting schemes making use of single-
member districts." 554 F.2d at 143. That assumption seems logical in light of the Supreme 
Court's handling of redistricting schemes. In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 
144 (1977), which involved a claim identical to that made in Kirksey-that a group's voting 
strength had been impermissibly diffused between several single-member districts-the Court 
examined the impact on the complaining group's voting strength in the region as a whole. 430 
U.S. at 166. In addition, see Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407,427 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). The standards established in White and Zimmer also look to the overall impact of the 
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Washington and Arlington Heights64 at greater length and attempted 
to limit the application of those cases in disputes involving racial 
vote dilution. Before turning to intent, the court affirmed two find-
ings of fact. First, the plaintiffs had proved at trial that, at least 
until only a few years earlier, blacks in Hinds County had been in-
tentionally excluded from participation in the political process.65 
Second, a showing had been made that the districting plan had been 
drawn without any improper motive.66 Despite the second finding, 
the court invalidated the districting scheme because of its perpetua-
tion of the proven prior intentional discrimination: 
Where a plan, though itself racially neutral, carries forward intentional 
and purposeful discriminatory denial of access [to the political process] 
that is already in effect, it is not constitutional. Its benign nature can-
not insulate the redistricting government entity from the existent taint. 
If a neutral plan were permitted to have this effect, minorities presently 
denied access to political life for unconstitutional reasons could be 
walled off from relief against continuation of that denial. The redis-
tricting body would only need to adopt a racially benign plan that per-
mitted the record of the past to continue unabated. Such a rule would 
sub silentio overrule White v. Regester. It would emasculate the efforts 
of racial minorities to break out of patterns of political discrimina-
tion.67 
Although conceding that Washington and Arlington Heights sharp-
ened the emphasis on discriminatory purpose, the Fifth Circuit in-
sisted that "nothing in these cases suggests that, where purposeful 
and intentional discrimination already exists, it can be constitution-
ally perpetuated into the future by neutral official action."68 In ef-
fect, the court interpreted the equal protection clause as placing an 
affirmative duty upon the defendant board of supervisors to amelio-
rate the residual impact of past discrimination. 69 
districting scheme on political participation. Thus, the Fifth Circuit was justified in applying 
those standards to the redistricting plan in Kirksey. 
A federal district court in the District ·or Columbia has similarly applied the standards 
developed in multimember district cases to single-member district complaints. See Beer v. 
United States, 374 F. Supp. 363, 394 n.254 (D.C. 1974), vacated and remanded on statutory 
grounds, 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
64. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
65. 554 F.2d at 144. 
66. 554 F.2d at 146. 
67. 554 F.2d at 146-47. 
68. 554 F.2d at 148. 
69. 554 F.2d at 148 n.16. For support for its decision, the court analogized to the school 
desegregation case of Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), in which the Supreme 
Court placed upon a formerly de jure segregated school district an affirmative duty to dises-
tablish the dual system. The Supreme Court then invalidated a "freedom of choice" plan for 
assigning students to schools because, though not itself objectionable, it served to perpetuate 
segregation rather than end it. 
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The adamant tone of Kirksey notwithstanding, the Fifth Circuit 
did not sufficiently explain its holding in that case or its assertion 
that Washington and Arlington Heights are free of any suggestion 
that past intentional discrimination may constitutionally be perpetu-
ated by neutral official action. The court argued that Washington 
and Arlington Heights 
would be of particular significance in the present case if the only issue 
were whether the racially neutral plan created such exclusion [from the 
political process] in Hinds County. But there is a second issue which 
we have pointed out, whether the plan; though neutral in design, was 
the instrumentality for carrying forward patterns of purposeful and in-
tentional discrimination that already existed in violation of our Consti-
tution.70 
The Supreme Court's holdings are not that narrow, however. Wash-
ington demands that "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be 
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially dis-
criminatory purpose."71 Contrary to the Kirksey court's assertion, 
nothing in Washington or Arlington Heights limits that principle to 
laws or official acts allegedly creating racial discrimination, as op-
posed to laws or acts allegedly perpetuating racial discrimination. 
Perhaps the Fifth Circuit meant that in adopting the districting plan 
the defendant board of supervisors consciously intended to perpetu-
ate a denial of access to the political process. However, it is cer-
tainly arguable that such an intent satisfies Washington's 
requirement, even though the plan itself was designed according to 
wholly neutral criteria. The court, then, had no reason to hold Wash-
ington inapposite. 
If, however, the court meant that the defendant board acted with-
out any improper motive, and that the scheme should be invalidated 
nonetheless because it perpetuated the past intentional discrimina-
tions not only of past boards but also of others unrelated to this 
board, then more explanation is needed, for that holding stretches 
the concept of intent beyond its normally understood meaning. Per-
haps the Kirksey court read Washington's intent requirement as say-
ing that, although an invidious law must be rooted in intentional 
discrimination, the intentional discrimination that taints the law may 
be something other than the motivation underlying the law's passage 
or subsequent retention. Thus, where a districting plan that per-
petuates a past intentional denial of political participation is passed 
70. 554 F.2d 139, 147 (5th Cir.) (en bane) (emphasis original), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 
(1977). 
71. .426 U.S. at 240. 
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with a wholly nondiscriminatory intent, or where such a plan is re-
tained for wholly permissible reasons, the plan is sufficiently associ-
ated with and tainted by the past intentional denial to be said to 
have an invidious quality traceable to intentional discrimination. 
But that interpretation comes close to the very argument the 
Supreme Court rejected in Washington: "that a law or other official 
act . . . is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially dispropor-
tionate impact."72 In almost any context, a disproportionate burden 
upon blacks can ultimately be traced to some intentional discrimina-
tion. This Note will argue in Part III that Washington can be satis-
fied by a racially selective indifference, even absent a conscious 
discriminatory purpose in the passage or retention of the law.73 The 
court may have been essaying a similar argument in Kirksey, but, by 
failing to limit its concept of intent, it re-invoked, at least to some 
extent, the rejected disproportionate-effect standard. 
It is curious that the next two Fifth Circuit cases, .David v. Garri-
son 14 and Parnell v. Rapides Parish School Board,15 neither men-
tioned Washington nor inquired into discriminatory intent. Both 
cases relied on the factors developed in Zimmer to evaluate claims 
that multimember districts dilute minority voting strength. 76 And 
though the court in Parnell listed "motivation for the districting 
scheme" as one of the factors to be considered under Zimmer,71 both 
the .David and Parnell courts based their investigations of constitu-
tionality squarely on the effect of multimember districting, not on 
the motivation behind it. 
The most thorough analysis to date of the post-Washington vote 
dilution doctrine came in four multimember district cases recently 
decided together.78 In the most important of . those ,four cases 
72. 426 U.S. at 239 (emphasis original). 
73. See text at note 111 infra. 
74. 553 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1977). 
75. 563 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1977). 
76. In .David, the court determined that a district court finding that an at-large election 
plan was unconstitutional was not supported by adequate findings of fact. In Parnell, the 
court upheld the district court's finding that certain multimember districts unconstitutionally 
diluted black voting power. 
77. 563 F.2d at 184. To suggest that the "motivation of the districting scheme" is one of 
the factors to be considered under Zimmer is misleading. At least prior to Washington, Zim-
mer did not require discriminatory intent for a finding of vote dilution. It did assert that a 
multimember district must be invalidated if''the state policy favoring multimember or at-large 
districting schemes is rooted in racial discrimination." 485 F.2d at 1305. It also stated that "a 
tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multimember or at-large districting" helps 
to establish the fact of dilution. 485 F.2d at 1305. It did not, however, suggest that either is 
necessary before the court may hold a multimember district unconstitutional. But see Nevett v. 
Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1978). 
78. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 
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-Nevett v. Sides19-the court held that the Washington intent re-
quirement does apply to claims of racial vote dilution in 
multimember districts. 80 After discussing Whitcomb, White, and 
Zimmer and after reiterating Washington's holding, the panel said, 
"The language of the Court in .Davis and Arlington Heights is unam-
biguous and admits of no exception. Analytically, nothing about at-
large districting legislation suggests that it should be treated differ-
ently from any other manifestation or official action that may impact 
groups of people differentially."81 The court then asserted that the 
Fifth Circuit's prior vote dilution cases are consistent with that hold-
ing, since Zimmer "impliedly recogniz[es] the essentiality of intent in 
dilution cases by establishing certain categories of circumstantial evi-
dence of intentional discrimination."82 Moreover, the court held 
that circumstantial evidence will satisfy the intent requirement 
"[w]hether invidious discrimination motivates the adoption or 
maintenance of a disiricting scheme or whether the plan furthers pre-
existing purposeful discrimination."83 After examining the district 
court's application of the Zimmer factors to the voting scheme in 
question, the panel affirmed the decision that the scheme did not 
dilute the black plaintiffs' vote. 84 
The Nevett court, after examining a line of cases from Reynolds 
v. Sims85 (the landmark apportionment decision) through Whit-
comb, to White and Zimmer, concluded that racial vote dilution in 
(5th Cir. 1978); Blacks United for Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 571 F.2d 248 
(5th Cir. 1978); Thomasville Branch of the NAACP v. Thomas County, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 
1978) (per curiam). 
Nevel/ was on appeal before the Fifth Circuit for the second time and was therefore la-
belled by the court Nevel/ II. This Note will refer to it simply as Nevel/. On the first appea( 
the Fifth Circuit had reversed and remanded a district court decision for the black plaintiffs. 
533 F.2d 1361 (5th Cir. 1976). 
79. 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978). 
80. 571 F.2d at 215. Judge Wisdom specially concurred in Judge Tjoflat's opinion. Al-
though he agreed that the black plaintiffs had not been the victims of unconstitutional vote 
dilution, he argued that it would not be inconsistent with Washington or Arlington Heights to 
prohibit vote dilution "without proof of racial discriminatory purpose." 571 F.2d at 231. 
81. 571 F.2d at 218. The court held that discriminatory purpose is essential to a fifteenth 
amendment as well as a fourteenth amendment claim. 
82. 571 F.2d at 215. 
83. 571 F.2d at 221 (emphasis added). 
84. 571 F.2d at 229. The court disposed of the three other consolidated cases according to 
the principles established in Nevel/. Bolden v. City of Mobile branded the challenged at-large 
scheme, which had been adopted in 1911, "archetypal of the intentionally maintained plan" 
condemned in Nevel/. 571 F.2d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 1978). Blacks United for Lasting Leader-
ship, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 571 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1978), and Thomasville Branch of the 
NAACP v. Thomas County, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), were both remanded 
for determinations under Nevetfs reading of Zimmer whether there had been intentional dis-
crimination. 
85. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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multimember districts does not differ from any other differentially 
'impacting official act. Part III of this Note suggests that that con-
clusion is wrong because the court failed to examine Fortson v. JJor-
sey, 86 a case decided between Reynolds and Whitcomb, which first 
recognized the racial vote dilution claim.87 The Nevel/ court thus 
misunderstood, as have all the lower courts dealing with this prob-
lem, the nature of the multimember-district vote-dilution claim. 
Moreover, the court's conclusion that a discriminatory purpose in 
either the adoption or maintenance of a districting scheme satisfies 
Washington answers the problem of intent in vote dilution claims 
only partially. Despite its statement that the intent requirement 
may be satisfied where the districting plan merely "furthers preexist-
ing purposeful discrimination,"88 the Nevel/ panel apparently read 
Kirksey as involving a districting scheme adopted with the conscious 
purpose of carrying forward past intentional discrimination. 89 That 
reading leaves unresolved the more difficult problem suggested by 
Kirksey: Whether, given the intent requirement, a finding that a dis-
tricting scheme which dilutes minority votes was designed, and 
passed or maintained, wholly without a conscious intent to discrimi-
nate, forecloses a holding of unconstitutional vote dilution. 
Thus, after one Fifth Circuit panel accepted Washington in 
Paige, the circuit en bane attempted to limit its applicability in Kirk-
sey. A third panel ignored Washington in JJavid and Parnell 
before a fourth again accepted Washington and applied it to the vote 
dilution doctrine in Nevett. None of these cases, however, explored 
in sufficient detail the ways in which the White test can be recon-
ciled with Washington's intent requirement, and none satisfactorily 
explained why White should be exempt from that requirement. 
Part III of this Note treats those matters. 
86. 379 U.S. 433 (1965). 
87. See text at note 140 i'!fra. 
88. 571 F.2d at 221. 
89. In reference to Kirksey, the Nevel/ court said, "Where the plan [that perpetuates past 
intentional discrimination] is maintained with the purpose of excluding minority input, the 
necessary intent is established, and the plan is unconstitutional. We so hold today in Bolden 
v. City of Mobile." 571 F.2d at 222. In Bolden, the court cited specific evidence of intent, 
including a legislative attempt to justify on non-racial grounds and thereby perpetuate the 
challenged at-large system, and the legislature's acute awareness of the racial consequences of 
its districting policies. 571 F.2d at 246. These are examples of a conscious discriminatory 
intent. 
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III. THE White TEST AFTER Washington 
As suggested by the survey both of post-Washington Supreme 
Court references to White and of lower court reactions to the intent 
requirement in vote dilution cases, the status of the White test for 
multimember districts is unclear. This Note attempts to reconcile 
White and Washington by suggesting two ways in which some of 
the factors listed in White may provide circumstantial evidence of 
purposeful discrimination. The Note argues further, however, that 
White should be viewed as unaffected by Washington for two rea-
sons. First, because it was designed as a protection of the right to 
vote as defined in Reynolds v. Sims,90 the effect-oriented test in 
White falls within a traditional fundamental interest analysis un-
changed by Washington's requirement of intent in racial discrimina-
tion claims. Second, even if it is viewed more narrowly as 
protection only against a form of racial discrimination, the test in 
White does not depend upon the type of disproportionate-impact 
analysis rejected in Washington. Rather, the impact required to sat-
isfy White falls solely upon the racial minority in question and is 
analogous to a type of impact-oriented standard apparently ap-
proved in Washington. 
A. Reconciling White and Washington: Circumstantial Evidence 
ef Purposeful .Discrimination 
I. The White Test as an Indicator ef Conscious .Discriminatory 
Purpose 
The Fifth Circuit panel in Nevett v. Sides held that some of the 
factors listed in White and Zimmer provide circumstantial evidence 
that an electoral scheme was adopted or maintained for the purpose 
of impairing minority voting strength.91 That holding follows logi-
cally from the Supreme Court's statements. Washington does not 
require "that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose must be ex-
press or appear on the face of the statute."92 An invidious discrimi-
natory purpose, according to Washington, "may often be inferred 
from the totality of the relevant facts."93 Moreover, the historical 
background of, and the specific events leading to, the law or official 
90. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
91. 571 F.2d 209, 221-25 (5th Cir. 1978). Accord, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra 
note 31, at 289 n.32. 
92. 426 U.S. at 241. 
93. 426 U.S. at 242. 
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act are two of the relevant indicators of intent listed by the Supreme 
Court in Arlington Heights.94 The actual impact of the law is, of 
course, a third indicator.95 All these kinds of evidence are consid-
ered under the tests announced in White96 and Zimmer,91 along 
with other facts, to determine whether, in light of "the totality of the 
circumstances,"98 a multimember district dilutes minority voting 
strength. 
Paige v. Gray99 illustrates how circumstantial evidence can show 
that an electoral scheme was adopted with a discriminatory intent. 
In that case, the historical background of the adoption of an at-large 
election scheme included the facts that Georgia's all-white primaries 
had recently been struck down and that a black-favored candidate 
had been elected shortly thereafter. 100 The impact of the at-large 
scheme was readily apparent: no black had ever been elected under 
it.101 On those facts, the court could have reasonably held that suffi-
cient circumstantial evidence existed to show that the at-large system 
was adopted in order to impair black voting stength.102 The plain-
94. 429 U.S. at 267-68. 
95. 429 U.S. at 266. 
96. 412 U.S. at 766-69. 
97. 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), qffd. per curiam on other grounds sub 
nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). 
98. 412 U.S. at 769. 
99. 538 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1976). 
100. 538 F.2d at 1109. 
101. 538 F.2d at 1109. 
102. Because the Fifth Circuit remanded Paige to the district court for evaluation under 
While and Zimmer rather than und~r Gomillion, see text at notes 59-61 supra, it did not 
"reach the question of whether the sequence of events leading to the passage of the [at-large 
system) was sufficiently suspect to compel a finding of racial motivation." 538 F.2d at 1110. 
The substantiality of the circumstantial evidence necessary to prove purposeful discrimina-
tion may vary slightly in different contexts. For example, the Supreme Court noted in Village 
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), that 
"[b]ecause of the nature of the jury-selection task ... we have permitted a finding of constitu-
tional violation even when the statistical pattern does not approach the extremes of Yick Wo 
or Gomillion." 429 U.S. at 266 n.13. See text at note 119 infra. In a case decided only 
shortly thereafter, the Court inferred purposeful discrimination from a bare statistical disparity 
between the number of Mexican-Americans called to serve as grand jurors and the proportion 
of Mexican-Americans in the local population. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,494 & n.13 
(1977). It may well be that the claim of racial vote dilution in a multimember district is 
another context in which an acceptance of somewhat less substantial evidence may be appro-
priate. As explained in Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword.· In .Defense of the 
Antidiscriminalion Principle, 90 HAR.v. L. RE.v. 1, 28-29 (1976): 
[l]t often is difficult to determine whether a decision was discriminatorily motivated. If 
courts may grant relief only when plaintiffs have made a clear case on the record, many 
instances will remain where race-dependent decisions are strongly suspected but cannot 
be proved. Although this is not essentially different from the difficulty facing the propo-
nents in most litigation seeking to overturn government policies, it is especially troubling 
in the race area. The accumulation of suspected but unproved race-dependent conduct 
• • . may systematically deprive minorities of important benefits. And the very existence 
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tiffs would, of course, then have to bring forth evidence of other fac-
tors listed in White to show that the system had diluted minority 
voting strength. 
In most multimember district challenges, minority voters could 
produce circumstantial evidence that the district was adopted for the 
purpose of diluting the minority vote. 103 Such a motive could not, 
however, be proved in all such cases, for many currently dilutive 
districting plans were initially adopted under "race-proof' circum-
stances when blacks were effectively disenfranchised.104 Thus, the 
argument runs, the plan could not have been adopted with a discrim-
inatory intent. 
Bolden v. City of Mobile 105 illustrates that circumstantial evi-
dence can show that an electoral scheme, although adopted for neu-
tral reasons, is maintained with the discriminatory intent of 
impairing minority voting strength. The at-large plan in Bolden 
had been enacted in 1911, when blacks were disenfranchised by the 
Alabama constitution.106 The evidence revealed, however, that no 
black candidate had ever been elected, that voting was racially po-
larized, that the legislature was unresponsive to black needs, and that 
election rules further impaired black voting strength. 107 From that 
alone a court might infer that the plan was maintained for a discrim-
inatory purpose. Moreover, and equally important, recent legisla-
tive attempts to perpetuate the at-large system, and the district 
court's finding that the legislature was "acutely conscious of the ra-
cial consequences of its districting policies,"108 strongly suggest that 
the election plan, although passed in "race-proof' circumstances, 
was intentionally maintained to dilute minority voting strength once 
the plan began to have that effect. 
The Nevett court did not make clear, however, the scope of its 
holding that circumstantial evidence of an intentional adoption or 
of a state of affairs which "everyone knows" is based on racial discrimination but no one 
will remedy is demoralizing and stigmatic. 
(Footnote omitted.) 
103. Many of the multimember districts in the South were adopted soon after black voter 
registration was greatly increased by the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 
89-110, 79 Stat 437 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1970)). See U.S. CoMMN. 
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 21-24. That alone should raise suspicions about the purpose 
of these enactments. 
104. E.g., Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978) (at-large system estab-
lished in 1911); Thomasville Branch of the NAACP v. Thomas County, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 
1978) (per curiam) (at-large system established in 1898). 
105. 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978). 
106. 571 F.2d at 245. 
107. 571 F.2d at 243-44. 
108. 571 F.2d at 246. 
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maintenance of a dilutive districting satisfies Washington. Specifi-
cally, though it reads Kirksey as meaning that "an innocently formu-
lated plan that perpetuates past intentional discrimination is 
unconstitutional,"109 it does not resolve the ambiguity of Kirksey's 
holding: Must the legislature adopting or maintaining a plan be 
aware of the dilutive effect and consciously intend to perpetuate that 
effect? Or does it suffice that the legislature, without a conscious dis-
criminatory intent of its own, perpetuates the discriminatory intent 
of past legislatures and of others? The language of Nevett suggests 
that the court meant to require a conscious intent to impair minority 
votes. 110 This Note argues, however, that the concept of intent 
should be broader and that a racially selective indifference should 
satisfy the requirement of purposeful discrimination. 
2. The White Test as an Indicator of Selective Racial Ind!lference 
The Supreme Court did not define "purposeful discrimination" 
in Washington or Arlington Heights.m The Nevett approach to rec-
onciling the "White and Zimmer test with Washington apparently as-
sumes that only a conscious purpose to impair minority voting 
strength is sufficiently invidious to satisfy the purposeful discrimina-
tion requirement. That approach then suggests that at least some of 
the factors listed in "White will reveal such a purpose. The initial 
assumption of that approach, however, may not be fully justified. 
Nothing in those cases indicates that the term is limited to racial 
animus, 112 and it is certainly arguable that purposeful racial discrim-
ination may appear in forms other than racial antagonism.113 Deci-
sions based on "racially selective sympathy and indifference,"114 like 
decisions based on racial hostility, assume a differential worth of ra-
109. The quotation is from Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 1978). 
The panel that decided Bolden, Nevel/ and two other consolidated cases, is referred to by the 
name of the most important case for convenience only. 
110. See note 89 supra. 
111. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 31, at 174 n.70. 
112. It is argued in The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 31, at 174 n.170, that pur-
poseful discrimination cannot "simply be racial animus; even clearly unconstitutional laws 
may have been prompted not by a desire to harm blacks but by the belief that the good of both 
races requires segregation." 
113. Brest, supra note 102, at 7. 
114. Id. Professor Brest defines "racially selective sympathy and indifference" as "the 
unconscious failure to extend to a minority the same recognition of humanity, and hence the 
same sympathy and care, given as a matter of course to one's own group." Id. at 7-8. See 
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 31, at 174: ''The use of racial stereotypes may be 
unconscious, and legislators may discount the burdens a measure imposes on a minority group 
without being aware that they are doing so." (Footnote omitted). 
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cial groups.115 Both decisions are unfair, "for by hypothesis, they 
are decisions disadvantaging minority persons that would not be 
made under the identical circumstances if they disadvantaged mem-
bers of the dominant group."116 Thus, "purposeful discrimination" 
may be defined to include decisions that reflect a selective racial in-
difference as well as those that reflect racial hostility. 117 
Rather than explore the meaning of "purpose" when faced with 
election districting cases, lower federal courts118 have been fond of 
quoting Justice Stevens' remark in his concurring opinion in 
Washington that "when the [disproportionate impact] is as dramatic 
as in Gomillion v. Lighifoot . .. or Yick Wt:! v. Hopkins, . .. it really 
does not matter whether the standard is phrased in terms of purpose 
or effect."119 However, the disproportionate impact of a redrawn 
boundary that excludes from the city all the blacks but none of the 
whites, as in Gomillion, or of the enforcement of an ordinance 
against 150 Chinese but against no whites, as in Yick Wo, can be 
quantified in a manner that the impact of multimember districts can-
not. Thus, the invidious impact of a multimember district is never 
as immediately obvious as the invidious discrimination in Gomillion 
and Yick Wo. 
More helpful may be Justice Stevens' recognition of the problem 
of defining "purposeful discrimination": even though the require-
ment of purposeful discrimination "is a common thread" running 
through racial discrimination cases, 120 the Court has never defined 
the term. Indeed, what constitutes "purposeful discrimination" may , 
be different in different cases. After summarizing the various cases 
discussed in the majority opinion in Washington, Justice Stevens 
suggested that: 
[a]lthough it may be proper to use the same language to describe the 
constitutional claim in each of these contexts, the burden of proving a 
prima facie case may well involve differing evidentiary considerations. 
The extent of deference that one pays to the trial court's determination 
of the factual issue, and indeed, the extent to which one characterizes 
the intent issue as a question of fact or a question of law, will vary in 
different contexts.121 
115. Brest, supra note 102, at 8. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 7. 
118. See Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108, 1110 n.3 (5th.Cir. 1976); Paige v. Gray, 437 F. 
Supp. 137, 160 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Brown v. Moore, 428 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (S.D. Ala. 1976). 
119. 426 U.S. at 254 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), and Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). 
120. 426 U.S. at 253 (concurring opinion). 
121. 426 U.S. at 253 (concurring opinion). 
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Thus, a prima facie showing of a purposeful discrimination in an 
election districting claim need not require proof of a conscious intent 
to dilute minority voting strength. If a legislature regards the im-
pact of a districting scheme with an insensitivity that would not be 
present if the scheme were disadvantageous to white rather than 
black voters, then the adoption or retention of that scheme should 
constitute purposeful discrimination. So defined, purposeful dis-
crimination can be proved with circumstantial evidence like that in 
White: a history of official discrimination-political and other-
wise-and a lack of good-faith concern by the legislature for minor-
ity interests. 122 Both factors suggest racially selective indifference, if 
not racial antagonism, on the part of the legislature. Where these 
factors in combination with other factors listed in White 123 demon-
strate that the districting scheme in question dilutes minority voting 
strength, an equal protection claim, complete with purposeful dis-
crimination, has been established. 
This interpretation of Washington's intent requirement resolves 
122. 412 U.S. at 766-69. One commentator has suggested that the relevance of historical 
discrimination or of discrimination in social contexts not directly related to voting "can be 
explained only insofar as these elements support a fmding of purposeful discrimination" un-
derlying the adoption of the election scheme. Note, supra note 50, at 380 n.137. On the other 
hand, the Fifth Circuit has held that no causal relationship need exist between past social and 
political discrimination and a denial of access to the political process since "[i]nequality of 
access is an inference which flows from the existence of economic and educational inequali-
ties." Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 145 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 968 (1977). 
The commentator's statement is too narrow. Past discrimination can hinder minority po-
litical participation in a variety of ways. The inferior education almost inevitable in a de jure 
dual school system can reduce the number of minority citizens educationally prepared to par-
ticipate in politics effectively. Moreover, in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodri- . 
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973), the Supreme Court did not dispute the assertion that inferior 
education hinders the "intelligent utilization of the right to vote." Discrimination in employ-
ment may limit the number of minorities fmancially able to seek office or to support a candi-
date. Stringent or unfairly administered voter registration laws may leave many potential 
minority voters with no vote at all. More generally, pervasive discrimination may imbue 
many minority voters with a sense that voting is futile. Cf. Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 145 (white 
bloc voting may lead blacks to consider registration futile). Thus, evidence of past discrimina-
tion is probative of more than simply the likelihood that the enactment of a particular election 
scheme was discriminatorily motivated. 
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit's statement in Kirksey is too broad: a denial of access 
to the political process should not be inferred from every instance of racial discrimination. 
Bui see Yelverton v. Driggers, 370 F. Supp. 612, 618 (M.D. Ala. 1974), where the fact that city 
recreational centers and the Boy's Club were racially segregated was deemed relevant to the 
black voters' challenge to a multimember district. The issue is noted in Brest, supra note 102, 
at 35: "When an act of discrimination denies its victims a benefit (e.g., the right to vote), a 
fmding that the present state of affairs (the disproportionately small number of blacks regis-
tered to vote) was caused by past discrimjnation is tantamount to a determination that past 
discrimination inflicts present injuries." 
123. E.g., a small number of successful minority-preferred candidates; racial bloc voting; 
racial campaign tactics; a large multimember district; majority, place, or anti-single shot rules; 
restrictive voter registration requirements; and cultural or language barriers that make com-
munity participation difficult. See 412 U.S. at 766-69. 
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the ambiguity of Kirksey's, holcling.124 It is unclear whether the 
Kirksey court held that the defendant board of supervisors had con-
sciously perpetuated past intentional discrimination when it adopted 
the districting plan. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs "presented substan-
tial unrefuted evidence showing a past record of racial discrimina-
tion engaged in by the county and of official unresponsiveness to the 
needs of the countis black citizens."125 In light of these facts, the 
court could reasonably infer that the challenged districting scheme, 
which perpetuated a denial of political participation even though 
drawn and adopted without a conscious discriminatory intent, was 
enacted with a selective racial indifference and would not have been 
enacted had it disadvantaged white rather than black voters. Simi-
larly, the plaintiffs in Bolden presented evidence of past discrimina-
tion126 and official unresponsiveness.127 Although the vote-dilutive, 
at-large system in that case had been adopted when blacks had no 
vote, the court could inf er from the totality of the relevant facts that 
the retention of the at-large system evidenced a racial insensitivity 
sufficient to satisfy the purposeful discrimination requirement.128 
This is not to say that all legislative acts may be condemned be-
cause of past injustice. A mere history of discrimination and unre-
sponsiveness to minority interests should not bar the legislature from 
adopting a districting scheme based upon valid motives. But where 
plaintiffs can show that the debilitating effects of past discrimination 
continue to inhibit minority political participation and that the legis-
lature has been unresponsive to minority interests in the relatively 
recent past, it is logical to conclude that the adoption or retention of 
a district plan that perpetuates a denial of minority access to the po-
litical process reflects a selective racial indifference and should be 
invalidated as purposeful racial discrimination. 
124. See text at notes 88-89 supra. 
125. 554 F.2d at 143-44. 
126. 571 F.2d at 243. 
127. 571 F.2d at 243. 
128. Surely racial insensitivity constituting purposeful discrimination can be manifested 
through inaction as well as action. It is naive to suppose that legislators are unaware of the 
impact that the districting scheme under which they were elected has upon voting strength. 
Where a districting scheme minimizes the voting strength of an element of the electorate, it can 
be inferred that the legislators are indifferent toward that element. They would obviously not 
be indifferent if the district had the same impact upon voters of the dominant group. Thus, a 
finding of purposeful discrimination would not be incongruous with the fact that the district-
ing scheme in question was adopted at a time when blacks were disenfranchised, and has been 
unchanged since. 
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B. Immunizing White from Washington: Vote .Dilution as 
Infringement of a Fundamental Interest 
The Supreme Court may eventually clarify its notion of "pur-
poseful discrimination." If the Court decides that selective racial 
indifference does not constitute purposeful discrimination, the 
problems raised by Kirksey will remain unresolved so long as White 
must be reconciled with Washington. The multimember district 
cases can be seen as unaffected by Washington, however, if they are 
viewed as relying upon fundamental interest analysis, a branch of 
the law of equal protection unchanged by that case. 
1. Suspect Classifications and Fundamental Interests 
Absent compelling justification, the equal protection clause pro-
hibits state action that discriminates against "suspect classifications," 
such as racial or ethnic groups, or that significantly infringes upon a 
fundamental interest. 129 White, as yet the only Supreme Court de-
cision declaring a multimember district unconstitutional, appeared 
to involve both racial discrimination and a fundamental interest. 130 
The Court in White did not say, however, whether it conceptualized 
the issue as involving racial discrimination, the fundamental interest 
of voting, or both;131 the Court's language is ambiguous. The Court 
focused on the racial minority plaintiffs in noting that in prior cases 
it had "entertained claims that multimember districts are being used 
invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of racial 
groups." 132 More broadly, however, it required challengers of mul-
timember districts to show that "the political processes leading to 
nomination and election were not equally open to participation by 
the group in question."133 
· 129. J>evelopments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1088, 1120 
(1969). 
130. Voting is clearly a fundamental interest. According to the Supreme Court in San 
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 33-34 (1973), only those rights 
"explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution" are deemed fundamental. In Dunn 
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972), the Court stated that it "has made clear that a citizen 
has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other 
citizens in the jurisdiction." See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); 
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
131. The multimember district cases have not expressly invoked the standard equal protec-
tion analysis of restrained or active review, suspect classification or fundamental interest. One 
commentator has suggested that the Court in White implicitly treated the multimember dis-
trict as both a burden upon a suspect class and an infringement upon a fundamental interest. 
The commentator then inferred that the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard and failed to 
find a compellillg state interest. See Note, supra note 50, at 372-73. 
132. 412 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added). 
133. 412 U.S. at 766 (emphasis added). 
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It is not clear from White alone, therefore, whether the Court 
conceptualized a multimember district that dilutes racial voting 
strength as a type of racial discrimination or as a type of infringe-
ment upon the fundamental right to vote. 134 The distinction is sig-
nificant because it may help resolve the uncertainty about the 
relevance of intent and effect in multimember district challenges. 
The Supreme Court has generally insisted upon proof of discrimina-
tory intent in racial discrimination cases, but it has been satisfied 
with proof of a significant infringement in fundamental interest 
cases.135 It is necessary, then, to determine which approach to equal 
protection analysis the Court has used in multimember district deci-
sions. 
Briefly stated, racially motivated laws or official acts are pre-
sumed to be invidious because they commonly rest upon general-
ized, irrational assumptions of the differential worth of racial groups 
and often impose upon the minority a stigma of inferiority or the 
frustration of an injury inflicted because of an immutable, inher-
ited personal trait. 136 . Of course, stigma and frustration may result 
as well from disadvantaging decisions that were not racially moti-
vated. Differentiation between individuals is necessary, however, 
and a presumption against all differentiations that stigmatize or frus-
trate regardless of intent or rationality would affect "an enormously 
wide range of practices important to the efficient operation of a com-
plex industrial society."137 The presumption of invalidity is limited, 
therefore, to decisions based upon race, since they are both harmful 
because they stigmatize and of little social value because they are too 
often irrational. 138 
In fundamental interest cases, the Court is concerned with the 
interference with a right explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the 
Constitution. 139 Whether a challenged law or act is invidious de-
pends upon the significance of the interference.140 Intent is less im-
134. But see Justice Brennan's chara<;terization in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 
430 U.S. 144, 170 (1977) (concurring opinion), of Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), as 
involving a suspect classification. Neither Whitcomb nor any of the Supreme Court multi-
member decisions have ever invoked the suspect classification analysis, however. 
13S. Compare, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), with Zablocki v. Redhail, 
434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
136. Brest, supra note 102, at 6-12. 
137. Id. at I I. 
138. Id. 
139. See San Antonio Independent School Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 33-34 (1973). 
140. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978). 
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portant in fundamental interest cases because, unlike racially 
motivated laws, the statutes or acts in question are not suspected 
either of resting on irrational assumptions about the differential 
worth of racial groups or of imposing any stigma or frustration upon 
a minority group. The concern in these cases is that the statute or 
act may unjustifiably interfere with a fundamental interest possessed 
by most citizens. Therefore, rather than examining the law's under-
lying intent, the Court evaluates the potential state interests support-
ing the law. Where the interference is substantial, the statute will be 
upheld only if it is supported by "sufficiently important state inter-
ests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests."141 
2. Multimember JJistricting as an Infringement of a Fundamental 
Interest 
The origin and development of the multimember district prob-
lem suggest that, although thus far only racial or ethnic minorities 
have successfully challenged multimember districts, the Supreme 
Court views the problem as an infringement on the· fundamental 
right to vote and is willing to hear challenges by members of political 
as well as racial groups. So viewed, the Court's emphasis in White 
on effect is understandable. Moreover, if White is seen as a funda-
mental interest case, it is unaltered by Washington, which, of course, 
dealt with a suspect classification. 
The landmark case in apportionment and districting is Reynolds 
v. Sims, 142 which stated that "the right of suffrage is a fundamental 
matter in a free and democratic society."143 The right to vote is fun-
damental because "representative government is in essence self-gov-
ernment through the medium of elected representatives."144 Thus, 
' each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective 
participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies. 
Most citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters 
through the election of legislators to represent them. Full and effec-
tive participation by all citizens in state government requires, therefore, 
that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of 
members of his state legislature.145 
141. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). 
142. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
143. 377 U.S. at 561-62. 
144. 377 U.S. at 565. 
145. 377 U.S. at 565. The rule of Reynolds was applied to local governmental units in 
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968): "Similarly, when the State delegates law-
making power to local government and provides for the election of local officials from districts 
• 
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The right to vote, then, is the right to full and effective participation 
in the political process. To assure each citizen an equally effective 
voice, the Court in Reynolds held that; in apportionment plans, "the 
overriding objective must be substantial equality of population 
among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approxi-
mately equal in weight to that of any other citizen."146 
Less than one year later, in Fortson v . .Dorsey,147 the Supreme 
Court faced the allegation that citizens who lived in districts substan-
tially equal in population to all other districts in the state, but who 
joined with citizens from other districts in their county to elect sev-
eral representatives at large, were denied a vote "approximately 
equal in weight" to the vote of those citizens who simply elected one 
representative from their district. 148 The plaintiffs claimed that the 
multimember districts violated the rule in Reynolds "because 
county-wide voting in multi-district counties could, as a matter of 
mathematics, result in the nullification of the unanimous choice of 
the voters of a district, thereby thrusting upon them a senator for 
whom no one in the district had voted."149 The Court was unper-
suaded: ''It is not accurate to treat a senator from a multi-district 
county as the representative of only that district within the county 
wherein he resides. . . . [S]ince his tenure depends upon the county-
wide electorate he must be vigilant to serve the interests of all the 
people in the county . . . ."150 The Court added in dicta, however, 
that its opinion 
is not to be understood to say that in all instances or under all circum-
stances such a system as Georgia has will comport with the dictates of 
the Equal Protection Clause. It might well be that, designedly or 
otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under 
the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or 
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the vot-
ing population. 151 
specified by statute, ordinance, or local charter, it must insure that those qualified to vote have 
the right to an equally effective voice in the election process." 
146. 377 U.S. at 579. 
147. 379 U.S. 433 (1965). 
148. 379 U.S. at 436-37. The Georgia senatorial apportionment plan attacked in Fortson 
created 54 districts. Thirty-one districts each contained from one to eight counties. The re-
maining 21 districts were located in the seven most populous counties; with each of these 
counties containing from two to seven districts. The 21 districts were created for the purpose 
of a representative residence requirement only: the voters in these districts joined with the 
voters of the other .districts in the county to elect all the county's senators at large. ,379 U.S. at 
435. 
149. 379 U.S. at 437. 
150. 379 U.S. at 438. 
151. 379 U.S. at 439. 
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The implication seems clear. In some multimember districts, un-
like the district in Fortson, the representatives' success will not de-
pend upon the district-wide electorate. Where multimember 
districting allows representatives to ignore the interests of a particu-
lar element of the voting population, then the voting strength of that 
element has been cancelled out. Perhaps at the time of Fortson the 
Court only vaguely sensed those circumstances in which a multi-
member district would render the support of particular groups unim-
portant in this manner. The subsequent cases have shown that the 
minimi2.ation of voting strength may occur where the district-wide 
population is large in comparison to the size of the group in ques-
tion, where past or present discrimination inhibits that group's gen-
eral political participation, or where electoral rules increase the 
difficulty of electing a minority-supported candidate. 
Fortson suggested that the right to full and effective participation 
in the political process-the fundamental right established in 
Reynolds-may be violated by a cancelling out of voting strength in 
a multimember district as well as by an inequality of population 
among single-member districts. Inquiry into the multimember dis-
trict problem necessarily involved "the practical realities of represen-
tation,"152 rather than the simple mathematical comparison of 
populations among single-member districts. But the goal of the in-
quiry was the same in both cases: to ensure an equally effective voice 
in the political process. It appears, therefore, that the Supreme 
Court conceptualized the multimember district problem as a threat 
to the fundamental right to vote, not strictly as a potential form of 
racial discrimination. 
The Court in Fortson correctly noted that racial minorities are 
the most likely victims of a minimization of voting strength. Its ref-
erence to "racial or political elements"153 should not be read, how-
ever, as limiting the vote dilution claim to those groups. Because 
those are the groups whose members are most likely to vote only for 
members of the same group, they are the groups in greatest danger of 
vote dilution. Nonetheless, the voting strength of other types of 
groups could be minimized in a multimember district. If so, the 
fundamental right of those voters would be violated as well. 
The Court's approach to multimember district challenges has not 
changed since Fortson. In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 154 the Court quoted 
152. 379 U.S. at 437-38. 
153. 379 U.S. at 439. 
154. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
March 1978] Racial Vote .Dilution 725 
the Reynolds principle that " '[f]ull and effective participation by all 
citizens in state government requires . . . that each citizen have an 
equally effective voice' " in the political process.155 The Court also 
repeated the "racial or political elements" statement of Fortson. 156 
The language in White is ambiguous, 157 but in Gqffney v. Cum-
mings, 158 argued and decided on the same days as White, the Court 
again quoted the Fortson reference to "racial or political elements." 
Later cases further reveal that the Supreme Court still views vote 
dilution in multimember districts broadly as an infringement upon 
the fundamental right to vote, not narrowly as a form only of racial 
discrimination. In Dallas County v. Reese, 159 decided two years af-
ter White, the Court reiterated that a multimember district will be 
vulnerable if it "in fact operates impermissibly to dilute tqe voting 
strength of an ident!fiable element of the voting population."160 And 
most recently in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 161 the Court 
again reaffirmed that districting plans will be subject to attack if they 
minimize the voting strength of "racial or political groups. " 162 
Although Washington sharpened the focus upon discriminatory 
intent in racial discrimination claims, it did not shift the focus from 
the significance of the infringement in fundamental interest 
claims.163 Indeed, the most recent fundamental interest case, 
155. 403 U.S. at 141 (quoting 377 U.S. at 565). 
156. 403 U.S. at 143. 
157. See text at notes 130-33 supra. 
158. 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973) (quoting Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439). 
159. 421 U.S. 477 (1975) (per curiam). 
160. 421 U.S. at 480 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs in .Dallas County were urban voters 
who alleged that their voting strength was minimized because, under the electoral statute, only 
one representative could be elected from their district in a county-wide at-large election even 
though that district comprised almost one half the four-district county population. The 
Supreme Court's rejection of that claim rested upon Fortson: so long as the districts were a 
basis for residence only, and not for representation, the elected representatives had to be vigi-
lant to serve all the voters in the county. The Court made it clear, however, that urban voters 
could successfully attack a multimember district if it in fact minimized their voting strength. 
421 U.S. at 480. 
161. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
162. 430 U.S. at 167 (emphasis original). As a practical matter, racial or ethnic groups are 
more likely than political groups to challenge a multimember district successfully. Racial 
discrimination, bloc voting, and large districts all increase the possibility that the interests of 
racial or ethnic groups within the multimember district can be ignored. These are the types of 
"practical realities of representation in a multi-member constituency," Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 
U.S. 433, 437-38 (1965), that the Supreme Court demands as proof of vote dilution. That a 
nonracial political group can marshal sufficient evidence to prove that a multimember district 
submerges its voice is certainly not inconceivable, however. 
163. The Supreme Court's statement in Washington of "the basic equal protection princi-
ple" is limited to racial discrimination claims: "[T]he invidious quality of a law claimed to be 
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." 426 
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Zablocki v. Redhail, 164 examined the alleged infringement at length 
without mention of Washington. It is logical to suggest, therefore, 
that the White test has not been altered by Washington and that the 
Supreme Court will not require proof of purposeful discrimination 
even when vote-dilution challenges to multimember districts are 
brought by racial groups. 
C. JJistinguishing White and Washington: Vote JJi/ution as 
JJiscrimination Affecting Only Minorities 
Even if racial vote dilution in multimember districts is analyzed 
as a form of racial discrimination rather than as an infringement 
upon a fundamental interest, the White·test might still be unaffected 
by Washington's intent requirement. The Supreme Court's insistence 
upon purpose in racial discrimination claims derives in part from its 
concern over the impracticality of disproportionate-impact analysis. 
As the Court noted in Washington, if an otherwise neutral statute 
were held invalid, absent compelling justification, solely because "in 
practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another," then a 
whole range of governmental tests, qualifications, and fee schedules 
could be called into question, however rational or neutrally moti-
vated they may be.16s 
Moreover, the Court's rejection of disproportionate-impact anal-
ysis rests upon at least two principles. The first principle, a pre-
sumption of rationality, was stated clearly in Washington: the Court 
will not review "the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and 
executives" without some evidence that an impermissible considera-
tion-such as racial discrimination-affected the decision chal-
lenged.166 The second principle was not expressed in either decision 
but probably underlay both: the equal protection clause protects in-
dividuals, not groups, 167 and does not recognize a minority individ-
ual's sense of stigma or frustration as sufficiently harmful to. 
invalidate a rational law applied neutrally to the majority of citizens 
where that stigma arises from the mere fact that a disproportionate 
number of those disadvantaged by the law happen to be of the same 
U.S. at 240 (emphasis added). Surely it does not follow that the Court will focus as intently 
upon purpose in fundamental interest cases. 
164. 434 U:S. 374 (1978) (right to marry). 
165. 426 U.S. at 248 & n.14. 
166. 426 U.S. at 247. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev, 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). 
167. Goodman, lJe Facto Sc/tool Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 
CALIF. L. REv. 275, 300-01 (1972). 
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minority. 168 The disproportionate impact may be great enough to 
suggest a discriminatory purpose, 169 but the Court in Washington 
rejected "the proposition that a law or other official act, without re-
gard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is un-
constitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate 
impact."110 
At first glance, Washington's rejection of disproportionate-im-
pact analysis might appear to conflict with the test developed in 
White for determining vote dilution in multi.member districts. 171 
The White standard-which requires inquiry into the local history 
of racial discrimination, the responsiveness of the elected white offi-
cials, the success or failure of minority-supported candidates, the size 
of the district, and the presence or absence of majority, place, and 
anti-single shot rules172--clearly focuses on the impact of the multi-
member district on minority voting. Nonetheless, an examination 
of the Court's understanding of "disproportionate impact" suggests 
that the effect-oriented test of White is still sound. The language of 
Washington and the prior disproportionate-impact cases cited in that 
decision173 reveal that the Court will not invalidate a prima facie 
neutral law where the law burdens more blacks than whites but does 
not burden an individual black more than a similarly situated 
white.174 Where the law burdens only blacks, however, the Court 
will declare- it unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court said in Washington that it had "recently re-
jected allegations of racial discrimination based solely on the statisti-
cally disproportionate racial impact of various provisions of the 
Social Security Act,"175 citing Jefferson v. Hackney. 116 In Jefferson, 
168. But see Perry, Tire .Disproportionate Impact Tlteory of Racial .Discrimination, 125 U. 
PJ\. L. REv. 540, 558 n.99 (1977): 
The relevant perspective is less that of the disadvantaged individual than the perspective 
of the entire racial minority. The disproportionate character of the disadvantage, because 
it constitutes a severe impediment to the racial minority in its difficult struggle to escape 
the legacy of slavery and oppression and to achieve real social equality, is especially bur-
densome. 
(Emphasis original). 
169. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,266 
(1977); Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
170. 426 U.S. at 239 (emphasis original). This rejection of disproportionate-impact analy-
sis applies only to equal protection claims. Title VII, and perhaps other statutory claims, may 
still focus on impact alone. 426 U.S. at 239, 247-48. 
171. See Tire Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 31, at 289 n.32. 
172. See 412 U.S. at 765-69. 
173. See 426 U.S. at 241 (citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); James v. 
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969)). 
174. See also Goodman, supra note 167, at 306. 
175. 426 U.S. at 240. 
176. 406 U.S. 535 (1972). 
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the plaintiffs alleged that they were denied equal protection when 
the state, after establishing a pecuniary standard of need for all So-
cial Security recipients, paid a different percentage of that standard 
to recipients of different grant programs.177 The plaintiffs made no 
attempt to prove purposeful discrimination;178 rather, they claimed 
that the payment scheme disproportionately affected blacks and 
Mexican-Americans because those minorities comprised a substan-
tial majority of the grant class receiving the lowest percentage of the 
pecuniary standard.179 The Supreme Court rejected this "naked sta-
tistical argument" since the "acceptance of appellants' constitutional 
theory would render suspect each difference in treatment among 
grant classes, however lacking in racial motivation and however 
otherwise rational the treatment might be."18° Clearly, the payment 
scheme disadvantaged more blacks and Mexican-Americans than 
whites. Those minorities were not the only persons disadvantaged, 
however; since the scheme's impact fell just as heavily on white re-
cipients in the same grant class, no equal protection violation had 
occurred. 
The Supreme Court in Washington 181 also suggested that James 
v. Valtierra 182 could be compared with Hunter v. Erickson. 183 These 
two cases reveal the distinction between impacts that off end the 
equal protection clause and those that do not. The complaint in 
James resembled that in Jefferson. The California Constitution pro-
vided that no low-income housing project could be developed by a 
state body until the project was approved by a majority of those vot-
ing in a community referendum.184 Claiming that the impact of the 
law fell most heavily upon the urban poor and that a "disproportion-
ally high percentage of racial minorities" comprised that group, 185 
the plaintiffs alleged a denial of equal protection. By contrast, the 
177. Recipients in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program received 75% of 
the established standard. Those in the Aid to the Blind and the Aid for the Permanently and 
Totally Disabled programs received 95%. Recipients in the Old Age Assistance program re-
ceived 100% of the standard. 406 U.S. at 545. 
178. 406 U.S. at 547-48. 
179. 406 U.S. at 548. The plaintiffs did not claim that the disproportionate impact was so 
dramatic that it implied purposeful discrimination. 
180. 406 U.S. at 548. 
181. 426 U.S. at 241. 
182. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). 
183. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
184. 402 U.S. at 139. 
185. Brief for Appellee Housing Authority of the City of San Jose at 7, James v, Valtierra, 
402 U.S. 137 (1971). 
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plaintiffs in Hunter challenged the constitutionality of a city charter 
amendment, passed by the electorate, that required that any ordi-
nance regulating property transactions "on the basis of race, color, 
religion, national origin or ancestry must first be approved by a ma-
jority of the electors."186 In neither case did the plaintiffs attempt to 
prove racially discriminatory intent.1s7 
The Court struck down the law challenged in Hunter and upheld 
the law contested in James. In James, the burden of the law fell on 
more minorities than whites, but it did not fall exclusively on minor-
ities since the provision required "referendum approval for any low-
rent public housing project, not only for projects which will be occu-
pied by a racial minority."188 In Hunter, the Supreme Court held 
that the challenged law "disadvantages those who would benefit 
from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations" and 
that, "although the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and 
gentile in an identical manner, the reality is that the law's impact 
falls on the minority."189 Thus, Hunter was not a case of dispropor-
tionate impact as that term is understood in Jefferson and James, 
where the impact burdened individuals of various group identities 
but burdened proportionately more individuals of one group than 
any other. The burdening impact of the provision in Hunter fell 
solely on the minority since, as the Court realized, "[t]he majority 
needs no protection against discrimination."190 And the Court de-
clared that this type of burdening impact, as opposed to merely sta-
tistically disproportionate impact, violated the equal protection 
clause. 
The Court's reliance on the burdening impact in Hunter as a ba-
sis for invalidating the law at issue in that case does not violate either 
of the principles underlying the rejection of disproportionate-impact 
analysis. Judicial deference to legislative acts is appropriate when 
those acts are rational and not arbitrary. On the other hand, bur-
186. 393 U.S. at 387. 
187. But cf. 393 U.S. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring) (asserting that the provision at issue 
had "the clear purpose of making it more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities to 
achieve legislation that is in their interest''). 
188. 402 U.S. at 141. Three of the dissenting Justices would have held the provision un-
constitutional as an express discrimination against the poor. 402 U.S. at 145 (Marshall, Bren-
nan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). 
189. 393 U.S. at 391. 
190. 393 U.S. at 391. The idea that the majority needs no protection against discrimina-
tion may not be as self-evident today as it was several years ago. See Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978). Nonetheless, the Court's reasoning in Hunter was sound. 
Though the challenged provision applied to whites as well as blacks, in reality it would have 
disadvantaged only blacks. 
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dens that fall solely on a minority are presumptively irrational and 
warrant a more probing judicial review. Moreover, the equal pro-
tection clause protects the individual, not the group, when invoked 
in the face of a law burdening only the minority. The individual's 
injury-that he is disadvantaged solely because of his minority sta-
tus-is, of course, felt by others of the minority group as well. Un-
like the plaintiff challenging a merely statistically disproportionate 
impact, however, the plaintiff challenging an impact that falls solely 
upon his group need not rely on the injury to others to state his 
claim. His individual injury offends the equal protection clause. 
With these precedents in mind, the reason why the plaintiffs did 
not prevail in Washington becomes clear. Their allegation that the 
screening test was unconstitutional because it "excluded a dispropor-
tionately high number of Negro applicants"191 presented no more 
than a statistically disproportionate-impact analysis. 192 As in 
Je.fferson and James, that approach was unsuccessful. 193 According 
to Washington, then, the equal protection clause is not violated sim-
ply because "a greater proportion of Negroes fail to qualify than 
members of other racial or ethnic groups."194 
It is important to note that the disproportionate-impact approach 
had earlier proved equally unsuccessful in the multimember district 
cases. The Supreme Court stated in 'White that, for plaintiffs to sus-
tain a vote dilution claim, "it is not enough that the racial group 
allegedly discriminated against has not had legislative seats in pro-
portion to its voting potential."195 Thus, something more than the 
191. 426 U.S. at 233. 
192. The Court has not completely rejected the use of statistics in proving a denial of equal 
protection. Indeed, since Washington the Court has given great weight to statistical evidence 
of a disproportion between minority population and minority jury participation. See Cas-
taneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). Nonetheless, the Court in Castaneda was merely 
following the rule it established in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 & n.13 (1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976), 
that a sufficiently dramatic disproportionate impact may evidence purposeful discrimination. 
193. That approach was, however, understandable. Prior to Washington, the Supreme 
Court's decisions left the role of purpose and effect unclear, and many lower courts had 
adopted a disproportionate-impact analysis as the standard by which to assess claims of racial 
discrimination allegedly violating the equal protection clause. See Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229, 242-45 & n.12 (1976). 
194. 426 U.S. at 245. 
195. 412 U.S. at 765-66. In fact, the Supreme Court's reversal in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 
U.S. 124 (1971), revg. 305 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Ind. 1969), was no more than a rejection of 
disproportionate-impact analysis. The trial court had "identified an area of the city as a ghet• 
to, found it predominantly inhabited by poor Negroes with distinctive substantive-law interests 
and thought this group unconstitutionally underrepresented because the proportion oflegisla• 
tors with residences in the ghetto . . . was less than the ghetto's proportion of the population." 
403 U.S. at 148. Absent evidence that the ghetto residents had less opportunity than did other 
residents of the district to participate in the political process, the Supreme Court held that the 
bare disproportion was insufficient to prove an invidious discrimination. 403 U.S. at 149. 
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naked statistical argument rejected in Jefferson all.d James is re-
quired to invalidate a multimember district. According to White, 
the plaintiffs must show that "the political processes leading to nom-
ination and election were not equally open to participation by the 
group in question."196 
Thus, it is clear that the White test, though characterized as ef-
fect- or impact-oriented, involves more than simply disproportion-
ate-impact analysis. Many interest groups, racial and nonracial, 
may be disadvantaged by the multimember district, for they might 
well be less likely to elect one of their own number in a multimem-
ber than in a single-member district. The mere failure to elect a 
favored candidate does not, however, violate the Constitution; 197 all 
that is required is that each group have a voice in the political pro-
cess. Yet, where a racial group has had its political participation in-
hibited by official and private discrimination, has been the target of 
bloc voting, and has been denied the legislature's responsiveness in 
the past and may be similarly denied in the future, that group has 
been denied access to the political process in violation of the White 
test. In this context, the multimember district more than decreases 
the likelihood that a minority-favore~ candidate will be elected; in-
deed, it guarantees that neither candidates nor legislators need listen 
to that group's voice. Thus, although many groups may be disad-
vantaged by a multimember district, only such a racial group's vot-
ing strength is minimized or cancelled out by that electoral scheme. 
In the final analysis, the impact revealed through proof of the White 
test for multimember districts more closely resembles that in Hunter 
than in Jefferson or James: it "places special burdens on racial mi-
norities within the governmental process."198 
Preservation of White's effect-oriented test, therefore, would not 
be inconsistent with the concerns the Supreme Court articulated in 
Washington. The White test does not open the floodgates to a tide 
of disproportionate-impact claims. Nor does it violate the principles 
on which Washington rejected disproportionate-impact analysis. 
Similarly, in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), a.ffd. per curiam 
on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976), the 
Fifth Circuit recognized that the evaluation of multimember districts involves more than a 
numerical inquiry: "[A]ccess to the political process and not population [is] the barometer of 
dilution of minority voting strength." 485 F.2d at 1303. In addition, see Beer v. United 
States, 425, U.S. 130, 157 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
196. 412 U.S. at 766. 
191. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971): "As our system has it, one candi-
date wins, the others lose. . . . But we have not yet deemed it a denial of equal protection to 
deny legislative seats to losing candidates. . . ." 
198. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969). 
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Surely even under Washington the court may justly withhold its ju-
dicial deference to legislative acts where their vote-dilutive impact 
falls, as it can in multimember districts, solely on the minority. Fi-
nally, under White the right to vote remains an individual right, 199 
and the plaintiff claiming vote dilution clearly asserts such a right. 
N. CONCLUSION 
White's effect-oriented test for multimember districts is unaf-
fected by Washington's insistence upon discriminatory intent in ra-
cial discrimination claims. Whether viewed as a measure of a 
fundamental interest or of racial discrimination, the White test falls 
outside the scope of Washington's intent requirement. Thus, in vote 
dilution cases the inquiry remains whether the multimember district 
minimizes or cancels out minority voting strength. That inquiry is 
simply a part of the constitutionally mandated goal of all election 
districting: to ensure each voter "an equally effective voice" in the 
political process.200 
199. See 412 U.S. at 781 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. S33, S61 & 
n.39 (1964). 
200. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at S6S. 
